University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
Theses

UMSL Graduate Works

4-19-2021

Warrant and Non-function: A Critique of the Sensus Divinitatis in
Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology
Lukas Merrell
ldmn7y@umsystem.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/thesis
Part of the Epistemology Commons

Recommended Citation
Merrell, Lukas, "Warrant and Non-function: A Critique of the Sensus Divinitatis in Plantinga's Reformed
Epistemology" (2021). Theses. 416.
https://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/416

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please
contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Warrant and Non-function: A Critique of the Sensus Divinitatis in
Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology
Lukas D. Merrell
B.A. Graphic Design, Carson-Newman University, 2012
M.A. Theological Studies, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2018

A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St. Louis
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts in Philosophy

May
2021

Advisory Committee
William Dunaway, Ph.D.
Chairperson
Eric Wiland, Ph.D.
Jon McGinnis, Ph.D.

Warrant and Non-function: A Critique of the Sensus Divinitatis in Plantinga’s
Reformed Epistemology
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a surge in attempting to demonstrate how a theistic
belief can be held rationality apart from classical proofs. Championed by philosophers such
as Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff,1 Reformed Epistemology attempts to defend
a God-belief (hereafter GB) as properly basic, which is therefore justified and warranted
apart from traditional argumentation. I take a GB to be that common theistic belief that
Aquinas referred to when he said that a person can know in a “…general and confused way
that God exists.”2 This GB could also include simple beliefs that may entail God’s
existence: “I believe God created the world” would be one example. Plantinga was of the
mind that there would never be sufficient evidence for this type of GB that could appease
the demands of the evidentialist. With this in view, he put forward a position of religious
epistemology that attempts to show how a GB can be on par with other beliefs we have on
a daily basis that are considered rational, even if devoid of argumentation. In this paper I
focus on Plantinga’s version of the RE position and analyze the accuracy of this type of
religious epistemology. While he has constructed an impressive epistemological system, I
argue that ultimately there are issues with his account because it posits a superfluous and
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ad hoc cognitive faculty known as the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga thinks that if God exists
and Christianity is true, then we should expect the SD to work in the way he sets it out.
However, the superfluous nature of this cognitive faculty is demonstrated by the fact that
there are perfectly good alternate accounts for a GB that meet the necessary conditions for
warrant and do not include a philosophically novel cognitive faculty. Further, a potential
warrant defeater will be considered for the RE account based on religious pluralism and
the idea that humanity has a history of being wrong in assigning agency and religious belief
to natural phenomenon. This warrant defeater provides motivation for thinking that the
epistemic environment would be faulty in which the sensus divinitatis is said to operate.
This thesis is defended by first looking closely at what Plantinga’s RE entails, analyzing
the necessity of the sensus divinitatis by looking at both perception and testimony models
of GB, and by considering whether religious pluralism is a potential warrant defeater for
RE.

2. Reformed Epistemology
2.1 Basic Beliefs and Justification
Essential to Plantinga’s RE account is the idea of basic beliefs. The basic belief
terminology comes from the epistemological theory known as foundationalism. In the
foundationalist account, there are some beliefs that are basic while others are not.3 The
beliefs that are basic do not require any inference from prior beliefs in order to be held
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rationally. On the other hand, if a belief is not basic, then it can only be arrived at by
inferring from one of the other basic beliefs. In other words, basic beliefs provide the
foundation for all other beliefs to subsequently be constructed. RE attempts to place a GB
as a properly basic. We can imagine this by using the metaphor of a ladder. Whatever
belief is basic in this system would remain on the ground below the ladder. This signifies
the fact that these basic beliefs will always be your starting point when you begin to
climb upwards. When you infer a belief from another basic belief, you begin to climb this
ladder. Each step on the ladder signifies a belief system that is being built from prior
beliefs. This is where the major difference between an evidentialist and a RE theory is
most visible. An evidentialist account for the belief in God would be arrived at much
higher up the ladder of beliefs, whereas the RE account wants to insert the GB on the
ground below the ladder.
One key part of Plantinga’s RE account involves the idea of a special God-given
cognitive faculty known as the sensus divinitatis (hereafter SD). This mechanism was put
in place by God to help guide us towards a GB. He draws this part of his theory from the
theologian John Calvin, who came to believe that the SD was taught by the author of the
biblical book of Romans. Plantinga explains this part of his position when says:
The basic idea is that there is a kind of faculty or a cognitive mechanism, what
Calvin calls, a sensus divinitatis or sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of
circumstances produces in us beliefs about God. These circumstances, we might say,
trigger the disposition to form the beliefs in question; they form the occasion on
which those beliefs arise.4
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He says further, “The central feature of this model is the stipulation that God has created
us human beings with a belief-producing process or source of belief…This source works
under various conditions to produce beliefs about God, including beliefs that immediately
entail his existence.”5 He believes that this cognitive faculty is responsible for producing
a GB. The SD is the reason for the fact that some people just seem to find themselves
with this belief about God while in certain circumstances. These types of circumstances
produce the stimuli that trigger the SD. These instances have a wide range of possibilities
but can include things like, observing the glories of nature, experiencing something
marvelous, experiencing an act of justice, etc.6 If this was the case, then it would be
possible for someone to suddenly be overwhelmed by the idea that they believe in God.
For example, you are sitting in your yard looking at the stars and beauty of the night sky,
and you begin to find yourself believing in God. This would be the SD at work. Plantinga
explains this well when he says,
It isn’t that one notes some feature of the Australian outback – that it is ancient and
brooding for example – and draws the conclusion that God exists. It is rather that
upon the perception of the night sky or the mountain vista or the tiny flowers, these
beliefs just arise within us. They arise in these circumstances; they are not
conclusions from them.7

Therefore, this belief that arose would be considered basic and not requiring any further
argument. Much seeing a clock on the wall and believing that it is there, believing in God
is basic and therefore justified. The person that finds themselves believing in God in this
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way would have no further work to do in order to prove that their belief is rational and
could ask, “what more do I need to prove in order to be warranted and rationally
responsible?” For Plantinga, the SD is essentially operating as an input-output device.8 It
takes in the circumstances mentioned above as an input and produces a theistic belief as
an output.

2.2 Warrant
The other half of what RE argues for is that a properly basic GB is not only
justified but also warranted by conditions that the SD meets. First, Plantinga describes
warrant as the thing or special ingredient that turns a justified true belief into knowledge.9
Further, warrant is achieved by a view known as proper functionalism.10 In essence, this
account of warrant states that a belief is considered to have warrant if it is produced by
properly working cognitive functions that are operating in a proper environment.11 The
cognitive faculties of a person forming a belief cannot be damaged or in an environment
that would hinder the proper functioning of those faculties. For example, if someone was
in a car accident and suffered head trauma, their cognitive faculties would not be in a
state to where warrant could be achieved. Plantinga also states that “the segment of the
design plan governing the production of that belief is aimed at the production of true
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Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 1st edition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 174.
9

Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 1 Edition (New York: Oxford University
Press USA, 1993).
10

Alvin Plantinga, ed., “Why We Need Proper Function,” Noûs 27, no. 1 (1993): 66–82.

11
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 1st edition (New York: Oxford University
Press, U.S.A., 1993).

5

beliefs, and there is a high statistical probability that a belief produced under those
conditions will be true.”12 Here, Plantinga has in mind that we need a reliability condition
to be met as well. He imagines a possible world where our faculties have been designed
by an imperfect deity, and that the god has designed our faculties poorly so that even
when they are functioning properly in a proper environment, we are still forming mostly
false beliefs. Plantinga’s conditions for warrant can now be summarized like this:

The belief must be:
1. Produced by correctly functioning cognitive faculties
2. Produced in a favorable environment
3. Produced by cognitive faculties operating according to their design plan
4. Produced by a reliable cognitive faculty.

For Plantinga, the SD is the cognitive faculty that needs to meet these requirements
for a warranted GB. Given that God exists and created this faculty, the SD is a correctly
functioning cognitive faculty that functions according to its design plan. Also, it is
operating in the environment in which God created it. Lastly, Plantinga would say that
the SD is reliable because it was created by an all-powerful God who’s aim was for this
faculty to produce truth.
Moreover, an important part of Plantinga’s account of warrant is that the knower
does not need to be aware of whether all these conditions are met for proper
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functionalism. This is crucial to his claim because he believes that one does not have to
be aware of the truth of SD or be able to defend it in order to have a warranted GB. This
is unnecessary to make his point about warrant. If a person who forms a belief in God
does so with properly functioning cognitive faculties in a proper environment and aimed
at truth, then the GB is warranted on Plantinga’s view.

3. The Superfluity of the Sensus Divinitatis
3.1 Extra Cognitive Faculty
As mentioned above, essential to Plantinga’s account is the idea of a God-given
cognitive faculty which was designed to produce theistic beliefs in certain environments.
However, there are some good reasons to think that the SD theory is unnecessary and ad
hoc. First, the idea of God creating humanity with this particular cognitive faculty,
presupposes the idea that God needed to do this in order for people to be able to hold a
warranted theistic belief. That is to say, God’s plan for having humanity come to hold a
belief in him, was to add a cognitive faculty, separate from reasoning, perception, etc.,
that is designed for producing a warranted theistic belief. Why should we think this is the
case? It does not seem necessary for God to create a separate cognitive faculty for this
purpose. For example, God could have (just as easily) created humanity with the ability
to form theistic beliefs by reason and perception alone. For example, God, (assuming he
is all powerful) who had full control over determining how to create humanity, could
have given undeniable signs in his creation that leaves people warranted in believing in
him. In fact, Plantinga himself clearly believes these types of cognitive mechanisms
(reason, perception, etc) are important because they operate within his RE account.
7

Perception is at work when someone gazes at the stars and then forms a belief that a
creator God exists. However, the relationship between the SD and the other faculties is
also quite ill-defined in Plantinga’s work. It is not clear what the order of operations is for
how it interreacts with perception. When someone perceives the night sky, does the SD
then take over in the place of reason in order to output a GB?

3.2 Perception Model
In order to demonstrate the superfluity of the SD, we need take the time to
construct a model that satisfies Plantinga’s four conditions of warrant without positing
this extra cognitive faculty. William Alston (who has appeared alongside Plantinga in
many publications on RE) defends a perception model, which aims at showing how
putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain types of beliefs in
God.13 Alston states his goal when he says, “And so far as I can see, the only way of
arguing, from that standpoint, that people do genuinely perceive God is to argue for the
epistemological position that beliefs formed on the basis of such (putative) perceptions
are (prima facie) justified.”14 It is important to note that Alston is not necessarily after the
same goal as Plantinga because Alston aims to show these types of beliefs in God are
justified. Moreover, Alston does not use the concept of warrant when defending his
theory.
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Moving towards that goal, Alston points out the important characteristics of
perception which separates it from reasoning. For example, seeing my car in the distance
(perception) is distinct from reasoning about my car, thinking about my car, or forming
mental images of it. Alston says that this marks the difference between “presence and
absence.”15 If I stand in front of my car and with my eyes closed and then open them, I
am suddenly presented with the object. That is to say, it appears in my visual field and
certain characteristics about it also appear to me (it is grey, two door, etc). In the same
way, this distinction is present when people discuss experiencing God. Someone might
say, “God was fully present to me during the church service.” Or, “I could clearly see
God after experiencing his beauty in his creation.” Contrast this with a statement like, “I
experienced grace which I believe comes from God’s love for me.” The latter is clearly
an example of someone reasoning to this conclusion, whereas the former examples
demonstrate how God was presented to these people in a direct way. This distinction
goes a long way in dispelling the critiques of religious experience who claim people
experiencing something and then later reason that it must have been God.
Second, Alston points out that in typical sense perception scenarios, phenomenal
qualities (shapes, colors, smells, etc.) are present with the object. However, in these God
examples, it seems impossible to point out any phenomenal qualities that are present with
a spiritual being. Alston notes that there are phenomenal qualities sure, but there are also
comparative qualities that are involved in sense perception. Comparative qualities are the
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ways in which the object can be expected to appear.16 Alston gives the example: “This tie
looks red (to me now) could be to say, ‘This tie looks to me now as a red tie would be
expected to look under normal conditions.’”17 In this example, we are not using the
phenomenal concept of red. Instead, we are using objective concepts of red tie and
characterizing this look by comparing it with other looks characterized in these objective
terms. To further illustrate this with sense perception, Alston gives these examples: “I
could correctly report that X looked like a house or a Porsche or a bald eagle or tasted
like a white Burgundy or sounded like Handel, thereby giving you an idea of how it
looked, tasted, or sounded.”18 What is important here, is that all of this is being done
without the use of phenomenal concepts. Applying this to experiencing God, most people
use comparative concepts to specify how God appeared to them. They are essentially
saying, “I was conscious of God presenting himself in the way I would expect an allpowerful, loving, good, deity to be presented.”
The final piece of the model depends on how these externalist questions are
answered. If God exists, (1) Is it possible that God should be what is appearing to people
in these experiences? (2) ls it possible that God should figure in the causation of that
experience in such a way as to count as what is perceived? (3) Is it possible that that
experience should give rise to beliefs about God?19 In summarizing Alston’s answer to
these questions, this will also give us insight into whether this perception model will
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satisfy Plantinga’s four conditions for warrant. To answer (1), Alston essentially says that
we do not have any reason to suspect that it would be impossible for God to appear to
people in these ways.20 There appear to be no a priori rules about what can and cannot
appear to our experience. Unless there are any strong negative arguments, the possibility
is prima facie sound. Moving on, questions (2) and (3) can be answered together. If God
does exist, then it is reasonable to think that he would be causally involved in these
experiences. Classical theistic truths hold that God is causally involved in governing the
world. Therefore, we can expect the intentional effort made by God to present himself to
people in order that they would believe in him. Further, it would follow from this as an
answer to (3), that God would be the object of beliefs in these experiences.
How does this show that Plantinga’s use of the SD is unnecessary? As we have
seen, Alston has put forward a model that demonstrates how a general definition of
perception can apply to experiences of God. What is important for this paper is to show
that the perception model can meet the Plantingan conditions for warrant. On Plantinga’s
proper functionalism account, he would agree that perceptual experiences where our
sense perception is operating correctly, and in a favorable environment, could potentially
produce warrant. What isn’t as obvious is determining what it means for perception to be
operating according to its intended design plan. With the SD, God created this cognitive
faculty with the purpose of producing belief in himself. Can the same be said about
perception? Again, granting that God does exist, it isn’t farfetched to say that one of the
intended functions of perception is to produce GBs. Obviously, perception was created to

20
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help us take in our physical surroundings, but there also exists the possibility (especially
given Alston’s model) that God created perception with the intent that he would appear to
us through this cognitive faculty. As I explain below, there are good biblical reasons for
thinking this is the case as well. Thus, we can say that perception correctly operates
according to its design plan when it produces an experience of God. Finally, Plantinga
also believes in the reliability of sense perception based off the previous conditions as he
expresses in Warrant: The Current Debate.21
We now have good reason for believing that Plantinga’s addition of the SD is
unnecessary for having a warranted belief in God. Alston’s perception model gives us a
way to meet the conditions of warrant without having to add the extra burden of an illdefined and philosophically novel, cognitive faculty.

3.3 Romans 1
Perhaps Plantinga could respond that he thinks there is good reason to think God
created humanity with this special cognitive faculty because he holds the Bible as true.
That is to say, the fact that Romans 1 teaches SD means he has reason to believe God did
create us with this additional mechanism. This, of course, is how John Calvin came to
adopt the SD in his theology. Calvin quotes from Romans 1, which says, “For what can
be known about God is plain to them (humankind), because God has shown it to them.
Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and
deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made” (Romans 1:19-20).

21

Plantinga, Warrant, 195.
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From this passage Calvin concludes, “There is within the human mind, and indeed by
natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. God himself has implanted in all men a certain
understanding of his divine majesty.” (Institutes I, iii, 1, p.44). Plantinga, in agreement
with Calvin, concludes that Romans 1 supports the SD.
However, on the surface, it isn’t clear that Romans 1 says anything about an
intrinsic cognitive mechanism that produces belief in God. In fact, it seems to teach that
by perception people can know that God exists. The author of Romans is saying that
God’s characteristics can be perceived by looking at his creation. Dunn, commenting on
Romans 1 says this, “That is to say, however precisely the phrase νοούμενα καθορᾶται
should be rendered (“clearly perceived”), it is scarcely possible that Paul (the author of
Romans) did not intend his readers to think in terms of some kind of rational perception
of the fuller reality in and behind the created cosmos.”22 I think Dunn is correct, and this
leads me to believe that Plantinga is doing poor exegeses in his reading of Romans 1 and
taking some liberties in his interpretation of Calvin. There is no reason to believe from
this passage that God implanted a special cognitive mechanism in humanity that would
aid in producing belief in himself. Instead, like the above example, Romans 1 is teaching
that God has left visible signs (i.e., his creation) in order for people to perceive and
discern that he exists. Let’s look at Plantinga’s stargazing example again. Someone, on a
very clear night, sees the grandeur of the stars like never before and perceives that this
beauty directly tied to that of a divine creator. The perception model is completely in line
with what Romans 1 is teaching and does not need the addition of the SD to make sense
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of what is happening in the formation of this theistic belief. In summary, even if one
takes the Bible to be true, there are not good reasons for believing that chapter 1 of
Romans teaches the existence of the SD.

3.4 Testimonial Knowledge
It becomes even more clear that we do not need an extra cognitive faculty in order
to have theistic knowledge when considering knowledge received by testimony. Deeper
into the development of his RE position, Plantinga gives an account of how someone is
warranted in believing Christian truths that are discovered within the pages of the Bible.
Here, he begins to shift the specific language of SD and moves into what he calls the
“Extended A/C model” or the “testimonial model.”23 Much like SD, Plantinga thinks the
testimonial model also provides warrant for holding basic beliefs concerning theism.
However, these beliefs are more specific theological positions, specific to Christianity,
which are discovered through the reading of Scripture. He believes that in these cases,
warrant is derived from reliable testimony. Specifically, there is testimony from God who
is working through the writers of each individual book of the bible.24 Plantinga illustrates
this when he says, “On the model, there is both Scripture and the divine activity leading
to human belief. God himself is the principal author of Scripture. Scripture is most
importantly a message, a communication from God to humankind; Scripture is a word
from the Lord. But then this is just a special case of the pervasive process of testimony,
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by which, as a matter of fact, we learn most of what we know.”25 The most important part
of this quote is the fact that Plantinga not only has a testimonial model built into his RE
account, but that also he thinks testimony is generally reliable and capable of producing
basic knowledge.
This admission by Plantinga concerning testimony has major implications for the
necessity of the SD. I believe there are two different ways in which testimony can be
shown to do the work of Plantinga’s model. First, because of the reality of scripture, this
means that there are de facto other ways that God has put in place for us to have theistic
knowledge without the need of the SD. The idea that God exists is clearly laid out in
multiple ways throughout the Bible. If someone reads the first chapter of the Bible, they
would already be receiving testimonial knowledge that a deity does exist. According to
Plantinga, this person would be warranted in holding this GB.26
Second, I think this is more evidence that the SD is completely unnecessary in the
type of GB producing environments that were discussed above. Returning to the stargazing example, it now seems completely reasonable to believe that God could
communicate knowledge of his existence through his divine self-testimony through his
creation. Imagine someone looks up at the grandeur of the night sky and comes away
with the belief that there must be a divine creator who is responsible for the beauty of the
stars. In theology, this type of self-testimony is called God’s revelation. Perhaps God did
design the universe in such a way to where he is constantly giving self-testimony through
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his creation that he exists. This is certainly the type of language that the Bible uses. For
example, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the expanse proclaims the work of
his hands.” 27
A model of divine self-testimony in these types of Plantingan belief-producing
environments will be very helpful in supporting this latter claim. Rolfe King puts forward
an argument that illustrates how all knowledge of God (excluding natural theology) is a
direct result of God’s self-testimony.28 In particular, King is directly linking the revelation
of God with testimony. He begins by defining direct testimony as involving “telling
someone that something is the case or indicating that this is so.” Also, indirect testimony
is where “someone arranges for, or just permits it, that someone will be informed about
something, or have something shown to them.”29 Self-testimony for King is either direct
or indirect and is concerned with someone telling another person about themself.30
Testimony can be taken to involve propositional, verbal, or signs, but it can also involve
non-verbal signs. This includes self-testimony because there can be situations where
someone could “indicate by tapping that they are present or give a thumbs-up sign to
indicate they are doing alright.”31 Importantly, King then defines divine self-testimony to
be when God either gives verbal or non-verbal signs through which knowledge of God
might be realized.
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With these definitions in place, King lays out the argument that all knowledge of
God, excluding natural theology, is from divine self-testimony. It is important to quote his
argument at length:
The argument that follows the letters 'ENT stand for 'excluding knowledge based on
natural theology'. The argument, which I shall refer to as 'the God argument' is this:
(1) Unless God permits an act, or acts, of his to reveal his intentions, his intentions
cannot be known [ENT].
(2) For all divine acts, a, if God permits it that a reveals his intention, i, then a is a
form of divine self-testimony.
(3) From (1) and (2) it follows that God's intentions can only be known [ENT] if
they are revealed by acts that are a form of divine self-testimony.
(4) It is necessary to have some knowledge of God's intentions to have any
knowledge of God [ENT],
(5) From (3) and (4) it follows that there can be no knowledge of God [ENT]
without some form of divine self-testimony.32

It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend all of King’s premises individually.
However, (1), (2), and (3) seem very clear. However, (4) is not quite as clear but can be
quickly defended. It seems true that knowledge of God would involve knowledge of
God’s attributes and power. Consequently, one cannot know about God’s character unless
one also knows something about his intentions. If one knows that God is love, then one
also knows God must have loving intentions. Further, King points out that all knowledge
of God must be based on actions that God has done. If we know things that God has
done, we know something about how his acts were intentional.33 With this, (5) follows

32

King, 281.

33

King, 285.

17

from (3) and (4) and leaves us with the conclusion that knowledge of God [ENT] is
always based on divine self-testimony.
Returning to Plantinga, we now have even more reason to believe that the SD is
superfluous. Plantinga accepts testimony as a reliable source of knowledge (including
knowledge about God in some cases). With King’s divine self-testimony model and
testimony derived from the scriptures, there are two more reasons for why Plantinga does
not need to posit the notion of an additional cognitive faculty. It is clear that warranted
belief in God can be gained through testimony.

4. Potential Defeater: Religious
Pluralism
I want to finish this paper off by quickly expressing some worries I have
concerning the effectiveness of RE accounts like Plantinga’s. Even though I have
demonstrated what I believe to be the unnecessary nature of the SD, it would also be
beneficial to analyze a potential defeater for the model. Plantinga admits that that while
belief in God is properly basic, it is also open to defeat. In fact, he believes that we need
to reflect on potential defeaters that come up in order to stay intellectually honest.34
Therefore, suppose that someone offers a defeater for the belief that God exists. The
intellectually honest person would need to reflect on that defeater. If the person reflects
and realizes it is no longer rational to hold a belief in God, then that belief must be
abandoned. On the other hand, if one spends time in reflection over a defeater but comes
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away thinking that it actually does not serve as a defeater to a belief in God, then they can
rationally continue to hold a GB.
A popular philosophical example of how defeaters should alter beliefs is the
widget example. Imagine there are widgets on a conveyer belt, and they appear to me that
they are blue. Proper functionalism says I am justified in believing they are blue.
However, I learn new information that there is a blue light filter shining on the widgets to
make them appear blue when in fact they are red. I now have a defeater for my belief that
the widgets are blue that I can no longer rationally hold.
There are different types of defeaters that are possible, but my concerns are
focused in on what is called a “warrant defeater.”35 Plantinga describes warrant defeaters
as being separate from rationality defeaters. He gives an example of this type of defeater
by referring to Carl Ginet’s fake barn example:
You are driving through southern Wisconsin; you seem to see many fine barns.
Fixing on a particular one, you say to yourself, “That is a splendid barn.” What you
don’t know, however, is that the local Wisconsinites have erected many clever barn
facades (from the road indistinguishable from real barns) to make themselves look
more prosperous. What you are looking at is a barn, and not a façade. Still, you
don’t know that it is a barn; it is only by sheer serendipitous good fortune that the
belief you form is true. (You might just as well have been looking at a barn facade –
indeed, you might better have been looking at a barn facade, because the ratio of
facades to barns in this area is 3:136

Plantinga says that the presence of the fake barns is a warrant defeater for you.
Plantinga also says of this fake barn country example, that the number of fake
barns proves that this type of epistemic environment was unfavorable for producing a
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warranted belief. In the same way, I believe there is reason to have concern over how the
existence of religious pluralism might influence the reliability of the epistemic
environment in which religious beliefs arise. Humanity is bad at getting it right when it
comes to beliefs about hidden agency based on experiences. In one way, this can be seen
by the numerous claims of supernatural or hidden agency experiences in the world. I
could argue that most of the claims or experiences have been proven wrong or debunked.
Since humanity has such a bad track record, this provides a warrant defeater for any
belief arising out of such an experience, including a GB. There is good reason to infer
that the environment in which these types of beliefs arise is not favorable for producing a
true GB. Further, this comes to a point given the fact that many different conflicting
religious beliefs arise from these types of processes Plantinga has in mind. Much like the
barn facade example, there are many different religious beliefs that all claim to have
knowledge of a divine being that exists. A lot of these theistic beliefs share very similar
qualities (higher power, creator, etc.) However, upon closer inspection, there many
conflicting ideas about that God is like depending on what religion you are a part of.
Since there are so many conflicting ideas of God, they cannot all be true at the same time.
Since they cannot all be true, this means there are many different false beliefs about God
that are produced through this process. The question remains; does the amount of
conflicting (and presumably false beliefs) make the environment unfavorable for
producing a correct theistic belief in the same way that the existence of fake barns makes
the environment unfavorable for producing correct barn beliefs?
I do believe that false religious beliefs are analogous to fake barns in that
example. Again, the fact that fake barns exist is enough to show that the epistemic
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environment is unfriendly for producing warranted barn beliefs. In the same way, the fact
that many different false beliefs about God and religion exist provides reason to think the
epistemic environment for producing a warranted GB is unfavorable as well. For
example, if a person in a God belief producing environment comes away with the belief
that there is a divine creator who is loving and slow to anger. There is a separate scenario
where it is possible that the person may have just as easily came away from a god belief
producing environment with the belief that there is a creator God who evil and malicious.
Clearly at least one of these two God beliefs must be false. Therefore, the existence of
false God beliefs makes the environment a “fake God country.”
How could Plantinga or a defender of RE address this? In Knowledge and
Christian Belief, Plantinga actually has a section on potential defeaters and includes
religious pluralism.37 However, he mainly focuses on moral and epistemic egoism and
not on the idea that pluralism is evidence for human error and unfavorable an
environment. Only at the end of the chapter does he mention the possibility that pluralism
could serve as a defeater at first but then later serve to make the initial GB stronger.
Plantinga says, “In this way, knowledge of the facts of pluralism could initially serve as a
defeater; in the long run, however, it can have precisely the opposite effect. The facts of
religious pluralism, therefore… do not constitute a defeater for Christian belief.”38 While
Plantinga does mention the possibility of pluralism being a defeater, he does not do so for
the correct reasons. Epistemic or moral egoism is not the issue for RE. The issue is that
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religious pluralism backs up the idea that humanity is really bad at getting this type of
experiential-religious belief correct.
At this point this leaves us with two options regarding the effectiveness of an RE
account. First, we can say that this warrant defeater provides a worry for meeting
Plantinga’s conditions of warrant if we were to adopt Alston and King’s models. There is
room to question whether the epistemic environment is conducive for a basic GB and
whether testimony would in fact be reliable given the idea that depending on who you
talk to would determine which religious belief you will be presented with. This leaves
anyone defending Plantinga’s view cheering because they would think the SD is the
answer for avoiding this defeater. However, I think this “fake God country” defeater
gives one reason to also think that the SD is never actually doing the job that Plantinga
thinks. This is simply because the warrant defeater outlined above gives us good
motivation for saying that the environment in which the SD would be said to operate in is
actually faulty. This failure in Plantinga’s warrant conditions would mean that the SD
was never able to output a warranted GB. The conclusion then would be that if the “fake
God country” warrant defeater is true, then the SD would be a non-functioning cognitive
faculty in Plantinga’s account.

5. Conclusion and Final Thoughts
Plantinga’s RE account attempts to place a belief in God in the category of
properly basic. I believe there is merit in pointing to phenomenal conservatism and
proper functionalism as epistemological accounts. However, as we have seen, Plantinga’s
account relies on positing an unnecessary additional cognitive faculty known as the
sensus divinitatis. Plantinga thinks that if God exists and Christianity is true, then we
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should expect the SD to work like he believes it should. However, this philosophically
novel cognitive faculty has been shown to be unnecessary by the existence of the
perception and testimonial models that successfully do the work instead. One interesting
thing to point out is the potential relationship of Alston’s and King’s models. For the
purpose of proving my argument, there need not be a relationship. However, Thomas
Reid drew an interesting analogy between perception and testimony that I think is worth
pointing out.
We have distinguished our perceptions into original and acquired; and language,
into natural and artificial. Between acquired perception, and artificial language,
there is a great analogy; but still a greater between original perception and natural
language.39
I have simply shown that there are better options to the SD model by illustrating the
perception and testimony models. However, it may be the case that these two models are
both correct.
I ended the paper by addressing the fact is humanity has a bad track record at
ascribing agency to things which turn out to be false. Coupled with the reality of religious
pluralism, this provides troubling grounds for RE accounts. I believe Plantinga needs to
demonstrate that we do not live in “fake god country” in order to ease these worries.
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